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Bernard Lonergan and Daniel Berrigan 
Robert M. Doran, SJ 
Asking what Bernard Lonergan has to do with Daniel Berrigan probably 
seems to some a transposition to personalities of the age-old question: 
What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem? Or, in an equally personal 
transposition, what does Aristotle have to do with Jeremiah? Whether 
either would approve of what I am about to do in this paper, I do not know. 
Whether Lonergan approves I will not know until I see him again in the 
kingdom of God, which I fervently hope will happen and which, I confess, 
I imagine happening every day. But I may learn earlier whether Berrigan 
approves or not, and so I proceed in some fear and trembling. 
Both were key figures for me during the major transitional period in my 
life, which occurred between 1969 and 1984, or between my thirtieth and 
my forty-fifth birthdays, and so I begin this tribute with some autobio-
graphical reflections. 
Autobiographical Reflections 
The years just mentioned followed something of a classic pattern of transi-
tion from what Carl Jung called the first half of life to the second (where, 
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of course, the word "half" is used loosely). Many of the events that Jung 
speaks about as marking such passages occurred for me during these fifteen 
years: major archetypal dreams (in some of which both Lonergan and 
Berrigan were prominent, though never together), significant challenges 
to both a radical appropriation and an equally radical rejection of elements 
in my national, cultural, and religious heritage, periods of darkness in 
which I could not find the way, and an emerging clarity about what I was 
to do with the remainder of the time God gives me. Never in that period 
was there a question of being asked to choose between what Lonergan 
represents and what Berrigan demands, despite the fact that the subse-
quent course of my life has certainly seemed to be a following more of 
Lonergan's path than of Berrigan's, a following that did not allow me the 
time to participate in social movements as much as I may have wanted to 
do so at times. Only in the fact that Dan and I both spent a great deal of 
time and energy with persons living with, and dying from, the effects of 
HN infection and AIDS did our work have much in common, and even 
then we were doing this work in different cities-he in New York, I in 
Toronto-and we were not working together in this ministry. I But from 
the time of the major turning point in my life to the present both Lonergan 
and Berrigan have been figurae, as it were, of something that I had to inte-
grate as best I could into my personal religious stance if I was to have any 
hope of living peaceably with myself. Never did I experience a dialectical 
conflict between what one stood for and what another claimed of me. As I 
look back on my life now, I realize that at every point, most of the time, 
without adverting explicitly to either of these Jesuit brothers as such, every 
step that I took had to satisfy what each of them represented to me or there 
would be something wrong with my choice. Whether I succeeded in such 
a delicate integration or not is ultimately God's judgment to make, and I 
will not know for sure until that judgment is in. 
What bound these figurae together almost from the beginning of my 
attraction to them? The expression that comes to mind is "their radical 
resistance to decadence and corruption." In Berrigan's case we are clear 
about both the resistance and what has been resisted. In Lonergan's case 
the issue is perhaps not as clearly defined. But I once heard the great work 
Insight (in my view the principal philosophical work of the twentieth 
century) referred to as a work of resistance against the sterility of some very 
influential neo-Thomist appropriations of Aquinas, and immediately I rec-
ognized in that comment my own appreciation of Lonergan's significance. 
Interestingly enough, for Eric Voegelin, one of the great commentators 
on the meaning of "Athens," of Greek philosophy, but also on Israelite 
... 
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prophecy, resistance to corruption is also what Plato and Aristotle, on the 
one hand, and the great prophets, on the other, had in common. 2 
But I must add that in the instances of Lonergan and Berrigan, as in 
Israel and Greece, resistance alone is not a sufficient explanation of a life's 
deeds. The resistance was in each case driven by a vocation to promote an 
alternative, and I have no doubt that with Lonergan and Berrigan the voca-
tion was from the God to whom each had given his life as a result of expe-
riences rooted in the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola. 
At any rate, the personal journey of which I speak began with the 
Vietnam War. While I was a doctoral student at Marquette University in 
1969, I was asked by the university to take a two-year break from my stud-
ies in order to become the first director of a new program in Campus 
Ministry. While the office of Campus Ministry did not open until August 
1970, those of us who were hired to staff that office became engaged with 
student protests that followed the murders at Kent State University in the 
spring of that year. It quickly became obvious to us that we had our work 
cut out for us, since some of the protests and protesters were on the verge 
of becoming violent, and we believed that our efforts had to model and 
encourage a different way to taking issue with what we believed was a 
national tragedy. It was an entirely new challenge for me, one that I was 
probably not quite ready to assume, and undoubtedly one at which, in the 
last analysis, I failed. During these years I often reflected on Fr Pedro 
Arrupe's reported comments to some young Jesuits who were working on 
the edge with issues of poverty and justice: "Be ready to accept failure, 
while still acknowledging that what you are doing is God's work. For you 
w illfail. " 
My efforts in my two years as director of Campus Ministry included 
advocacy on peace issues, draft counseling, and antiwar activities, and this 
part of our service to the university met with greater resistance than did the 
more sacramental dimensions of our work (except when these incorpo-
rated the advocacy, which they often did). While in my studies I was already 
a thoroughly committed student of Lonergan, throughout this period it 
was the figure of Daniel Berrigan that was more prominent in my thoughts 
and in my psyche. Berrigan was quoted more than anyone else in the hom-
ilies that I gave on a regular basis during these years. He was present in my 
dreams on a number of occasions, beginning during these two years but 
also for several years afterward, always as a friendly figure but also always 
standing precisely for what we all know he represents. I took away from 
these experiences, and especially from Berrigan's presence in these dreams, 
a deep-seated affective consolidation of his message as something that had 
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to remain with me no matter what else I might do in the future. Again, the 
extent to which I have actually allowed this to happen is God's judgment 
to make. 
On my return to doctoral studies in 1972 , I addressed in study and writ-
ing a number of the issues that had already engaged my attention in the 
years of active social involvement. By this time in his own development, 
Lonergan had made the theme of conversion central in his work, so central 
that today people who know little else about Lonergan know that con-
version is at the heart of his work. He had also returned to the study of 
economics, driven by deep concerns for the transformation of economic 
systems so that they could deliver justice. 
My own reflection on what conversion entailed, however, took me in 
directions that were not yet explicit in Lonergan's work, directions tha thad 
been opened up, however, by my recent experiences and struggles. While 
Lonergan was eventually to approve these directions, the initial steps had 
to be taken alone and, like Lonergan's work in Insight, were conceived in 
my mind as entailing resistance to an intellectual neglect: this time a neglect 
of the energic flow of sensations, memories, images, emotions, conations, 
bodily movements, spontaneous responses to persons and situations, asso-
ciations. In a homily marking the beginning of the Campus Ministry pro-
gram at Marquette I quoted something that Berrigan had written in an 
open letter to the Jesuits, published, I believe, in National Catholic Reporter, 
to the effect that, until the individual changes, nothing changes.3 And while 
I had always recognized that this emphasis was entirely congruent with 
Lonergan's notion of conversion, I now was beginning to understand that 
the change demanded could assume dimensions beyond those that are 
explicit in Lonergan's writings. For what is it that drives and impels the 
forces of death against which Berrigan has set all his might and energy? 
From a theological point of view, it is the sin of the world, what good 
Scholastic theology would have called peccatllm originale originatum (origi-
nated original sin), but precisely as this sin of the world is objectified in the 
social machinery, including military technology, characteristic of the impe-
rial society into which American children are born, and in which they are 
raised, socialized, acculturated, educated. So much of this distortion, this 
creation of a false "second reality," takes place at an elemental psychic level 
without the children having anything to do with the reception of a grossly 
deviated set, indeed scale, of values. Surely the turning about, the repudia-
tion of what has been, that is part of any genuine conversion process must 
include tapping into this psychic reservoir and allowing it to be trans-
formed by God's grace. 
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And so I developed the notion of a psychic dimension to conversion, to 
complement and accompany the intellectual, moral, and religious dimen-
sions that Lonergan had highlighted. The psychic conversion that I was 
talking about was closely aligned to the social concerns that Berrigan rep-
resented, for it is in the energic flow of psychic responses that our values 
first come to be set for us, before we have had any say in the matter, and in 
the case of Americans (as of course for everyone else) this means universally 
a mixture of good and evil and often a preponderance of the latter. The 
conversion demanded of this country in particular cuts very deep, much 
deeper than we are prepared to admit, as Berrigan has never ceased to 
remind us. It is the conversion of an entire scale of values from an imperi-
alistic distortion to the fostering of genuine community on a global scale. 
I pursued in my doctoral dissertation the connection of the psychic 
conversion that I was promoting with Lonergan's intellectual, moral, and 
religious conversion, and, to my great delight and joy, found that Lonergan 
was heartily supportive of what I was attempting to do. He expressed his 
enthusiasm to me personally in the fall of 1973, and I can say that in many 
ways my life has never been the same since then. The path was set, the 
vocation within a vocation was determined, and that path and vocation 
were to be intellectual and academic. That much was clear by the time 
I completed doctoral studies in 1975, though it was further consolidated 
shortly after I arrived in Toronto in 1979, when Lonergan called me from 
Boston and asked me to be one of the executors of his literary estate. That 
request has led me eventually to assuming responsibility, for the publica-
tion of his collected works, for the first twenty years of the project together 
with Frederick E. Crowe: something that, shortly before he died in 1984, 
I promised him I would do.4 That promise and the responsibility it demands 
to secure Lonergan's legacy as best I can have determined the course of my 
life ever since and will continue to do so until I can work no more. 
At the time of Lonergan's death Fred Crowe and I had already suc-
ceeded in getting the University of Toronto Press interested in publishing 
Lonergan's collected works, and we were busy planning for the establish-
ment of the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto, partly for the sake of 
seeing to the production of the Collected Works. While the latter institu-
tional venture did not fulfill the hopes that Fred and I had for it, the work 
that the Institute began-preserving, promoting, developing, and imple-
menting Lonergan's work-continues in other venues and under other 
auspices. If Daniel Berrigan has experienced that a prophet is not without 
honor except among his own people, Lonergan knew the same fate, and 
unfortunately it has continued after his death. 
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I wish to emphasize that through all of these trans formative and deter-
minative events it remained clear to me that I had to take with me on that 
path the Berrigan influence that had touched my inner life just as deeply as 
had Lonergan's writings, or else the very pursuit of the path that Lonergan 
offered to me, in fact gave to me, would not be genuine. 
Next, I will discuss the two ways in which I hope Berrigan accompanied 
Lonergan in my own life as that life moved forward from the point just 
narrated. These two ways had to do with justice for the poor and nonvio-
lent resistance to evil. I would like to articulate how these commitments 
have informed my work over the past thirty-plus years, and offer that in 
tribute to Daniel Berrigan, poor token though it may be of my apprecia-
tion for his courage, strength, and inspiration. 
The Option for the Poor 
How are we to speak today about whatJesus proclaimed as the kingdom or 
reign of God in human society and history? That was the issue that preoc-
cupied me in the 1980s when I spent a good decade writing what became 
Theology and the Dialectics of History. s I took with me into this decade the 
commitments and orientations that both Lonergan and Berrigan stood for, 
and a quite central obligation that I put on myself in writing this book was 
to make sure that each of these orientations was acknowledged in it. 
Theology and the Dialectics of History, a book that I admit is too long, is an 
effort to provide at least some of the basic categories that might be useful 
in our time to speak about the reality that Jesus proclaimed in his own 
Jewish context. The book is structured around a vast and complicated 
development of a very simple schema of a scale of values that Lonergan 
presents in Method in Theology.6 And the book emphasizes that it is the role 
of the Church, as the community of the servant of God, to evoke the inte-
gral functioning of that normative scale.7 
The scale itself is a function of Lonergan's complication of his own ear-
lier schema of the so-called "levels" of intentional consciousness: presenta-
tions, understanding, judgment, and decisions. For to each of these 
dimensions of intentional consciousness there corresponds an isomorphic 
component of the human good: vital values to presentations, the social 
good of order to understanding, culture to judgment, and personal authen-
ticity to decision. And as the structure of intentional consciousness is not a 
closed structure but one that is open to the fulfillment that only God's love 
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can provide, so the socio-historical unfolding of the normative scale of 
values is open to and receptive of the communication of God's grace and 
God's message. Thus a scale of values is established that proceeds "from 
below" from vital to social to cultural to personal to religious values, and 
"from above" from the gift of God's grace to personal authenticity, from 
personal authenticity to cultural transformation, from cultural transforma-
tion to the justice of the social order, and from social justice to the equita-
ble distribution of vital goods to the entire community. While the scale 
enables us to develop a notion of collective responsibility (something that 
Lonergan himself called forB), I call attention here to the role of the con-
version of the individual, the level of personal value. Just as Berrigan once 
stressed in writing to his Jesuit brothers that until the individual changes, 
nothing changes, so Lonergan emphasizes that personal conversion is at 
the heart of social and historical transformation. But I call attention as well 
to the obvious fact that for each of them personal conversion is not an end 
in itself but the result perhaps of a series of withdrawals for the sake of a 
return to caring for the integrity of cultural meanings, the justice of the 
social order, and the equitable availability of vital goods. 
There is a schematic neatness to the scale that probably has led some 
people to think of it as little more than a model, but that criticism would 
be justified only if the base from which the scale is constructed is itself 
nothing more than a model. There is, of course, basically nothing wrong 
with models. As Lonergan stresses, they may be very helpful in the task of 
actually describing or explaining reality.9 But they are not themselves such 
descriptions or explanations. But if the base of the scheme lies in the invari-
ant structure of conscious intentionality as it moves from presentations to 
understanding, from understanding to judgment, and from judgment to 
decision, or in the other direction from falling in love with God to a trans-
valuation of values, from that change to a new cognitive appreciation of 
the world, and from that eye of love to action on behalf of justice, then we 
are talking about more than a model. And such is indeed the base of the 
normative scale of values. 
This is probably not the appropriate place to venture into the further 
complications of the scale that are due to the dialectical structure of per-
sonal, cultural, and social values, except, of course, to stress that these 
dialectical structures are distorted by the same sin of the world, the same 
"originated original sin," that, writ large (very large indeed), constitutes by 
default the social and military monstrosities which so much of Daniel 
Berrigan's life has committed to calling by its true names: idolatry, lust for 
power. Thus, the book constructs and amplifies the notion of the scale of 
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values in direct antithesis to the distortions wrought by imperialistic and 
totalitarian ambitions. 
The individual aspects are, of course, not neglected. The scale is a func-
tion of the affective component of each of the levels of intentional con-
sciousness, of feeling's response to possible values. The criterion of the 
scale is the degree of self-transcendence to which we are carried in our 
responses. And the deviation of that affective self-transcendence is a func-
tion of the wounded psychic structures-wounded by forces beyond the 
individual's control at the time of the wounding-that my notion of psy-
chic conversion was meant to tease out as the individual takes on the task 
of what Lonergan calls self-appropriation. 
But despite these emphases on the healing and conversion of the indi-
vidual, I argue in Theology and the Dialectics of History that a full-scale 
presentation of the scale of values might constitute something of a tran-
scendental argument for the liberation emphases on the preferential option 
for the poor, emphases which, however begrudgingly at times, official 
church teaching has acknowledged. For problems in the equitable distribu-
tion of vital goods can be resolved in justice only by transformations in 
social structures, in technologies, economies, polities, and spontaneous 
interrelatedness; and these transformations demand changes in the mean-
ings and values by which people live, which changes in turn are a function 
of the conversion of the person to authentic self-transcendence-until the 
individual changes, nothing changes. But that personal transformation 
itself depends on the gift of God's grace, which is required for consistent 
self-transcendent performance affectively, intellectually, morally, and 
politically. Conversely, then, God's gift oflove effects personal transforma-
tion; such conversion shows itself in the transformation of the meanings 
and values constitutive of a culture; this transformation alone guarantees 
the justice of the social order, which itself is required for the equitable dis-
tribution of the earth's vital goods. The so-called transcendental structure 
of presentations, understanding, judging, and deciding has been compli-
cated to yield a scale of values that itself provides the church with a firm 
validation of the liberation insights into the preferential option for the 
poor. Perhaps it also provides a framework within which contemporary 
theology can speak of the reign of God, with some hope of continuity 
with what Jesus meant when he called for a radical conversion in his 
own context. Explicit consideration is given to the distortions of the scale 
found in Western imperialism and in what at the time I wrote the book 
was Soviet totalitarianism. Joseph Schumpter's definition of imperialism 
as "the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible 
... 
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expansion"Io was developed in the context of the distortion that such a 
disposition causes in the entire scale of values. 
Violence and Religion 
I turn now to considerations that emerges from a closer inspection of the 
structure and dynamics of genuine religion. "Religious values" as they 
function within the scale of values will upset and distort the entire scale in 
the direction of deviation if in fact they really are religious aberrations. 
And religious aberration is manifest in the involvement of religion with the 
structures and mechanisms of violence. There is no going back, I both 
hope and fear at the same time, on Rene Girard's emphasis on the violent 
nature of most religion (including a great deal of historical Christianity). 
We can only move forward , to face the delicate and difficult questions 
regarding what these insights will mean for the church and its institutions 
in the twenty-first century, and especially regarding its relations with the 
other religions of humankind. 
In my understanding of a quite complex set of conceptual relations, 
Girard's work connects with Lonergan's precisely through the notion of 
psychic conversion, while the latter notion gains from Girard a greater 
precision than I was able to give it previously. In my previous efforts, 
I contrasted with other psychological efforts, most notably those of 
C. G. lung, the depth-psychological system that emerges when one under-
stands the human psyche-at the empirical level, the flow of sensations, 
images, emotions, conations, associations, conscious bodily movements, 
spontaneous intersubjective responses-in light of Lonergan's analysis of 
intentional consciousness. While it is true that this contrast already sets the 
stage for a reorientation of depth-psychological thinking and practice on 
the basis of foundations that ultimately are theological-religious, moral, 
and intellectual conversion-still, there is a greater precision to be gained 
by understanding the psyche in Girard's terms. Let me explain. 
In his mammoth work on the systematics of the Trinity, Lonergan makes 
a distinction that I have found helpful not only in explaining what I mean 
by psychic conversion and how I understand its relation to Lonergan's 
work but also in introducing within a Lonergan-inspired framework the 
dimensions that Girard brings to the fore. He writes: 
we are conscious in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we 
undergo rather passively what we sense and imagine, our desires and 
fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sadness; in another way, 
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through our intellectuality, we are more active when we consciously 
inquire in order to understand, understand in order to utter a word, 
weigh evidence in order to judge, deliberate in order to choose, and 
exercise our will in order to act. r r 
My previous efforts at integrating depth-psychological with intention-
ality analysis and at reorienting the former in the light of the latter stayed 
within the kind of framework that this quotation establishes: a framework 
that, despite the social motivation instrumental in the original develop-
ment of the notion of psychic conversion, is still highly individual in char-
acter. What Girard helped me to recognize more clearly is that the first 
"way of being conscious" that Lonergan specifies here is precisely not at 
first and for the most part exclusively individual but, in Girard's term, inter-
dividual, a function of the priority of the social over the individual. Girard's 
notion of the interdividual gives us a purchase on the theology of original 
sin that may prove to be epochal. Lonergan speaks of bias and is quick 
to acknowledge, especially in what he says about dramatic and group bias, 
the presence of a psychic component that distorts and derails the quest 
for meaning and truth and goodness. But for Girard, the dramatic or emo-
tional or psychic component of bias is a function of the mimetic character 
of human desire. For Girard, what occurs at the level of the passive under-
going of our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and sad-
ness, is mimetic. Many, perhaps most, of our desires are not autonomous 
or innate, but copied from others. "If I desire a particular object, I do not 
covet it on its own merits but because I 'mimic,' or imitate, the desire of 
someone I have chosen as a model. That person-whether real or imagi-
nary, legendary or historical-becomes the mediator of my desire, and the 
relationship in which I am involved is essentially 'triangular.'''12 
Now what Girard calls the "object" can be located at or related to any 
of the levels of value in the scale of values. There is mimetic rivalry in the 
academy and the Church, just as there is in the wider society. Mimesis in 
itself (or in the abstract) is neutral. But acquisitive or appropriative mimesis 
leads to violence, whether overt or covert. Acquisitive mimesis is focused 
on the object because of the model or mediator, but eventually the object 
all but drops out of sight, and the subject becomes obsessed-and it is 
indeed an obsession-almost exclusively with the model or mediator. 
Mimesis then becomes conflicrual. Conflictual memesis is contagious. It 
can infect a community, an institution, a governing body, a religious estab-
lishment, and it can endanger the welfare and even the survival of the 
groups if affects, at least until the focus turns on one individual or group, 
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namely, the scapegoat, whose immolation, exclusion, or expulsion brings a 
precarious peace. The victimization mechanism is the origin of a deviated 
transcendence that characterizes a great deal of human religion. 
Such is the basic schema that governs much of Girard's thinking. 
According to Girard, however, there is a progressive revelation in the bibli-
cal texts of this set of mimetic mechanisms, which finally become unveiled 
for all to see-and so lose their power-in the crucifixion oEJesus. [3 This 
liberation is one element of the salvation that the cross and redemption of 
Jesus effect. Perhaps through Girard's help we will come to see it as a cen-
tral element in soteriology, and perhaps also we will see mimetic violence 
as the basic element in the sin of the world . The original temptation is 
represented in the Book of Genesis as awakening a desire to be like God 
(or like gods). The first murder recorded in the bible is prompted by 
mimetic rivalry. The Gospels of Mark and Matthew tell us that Pilate knew 
that the reason the chief priests had handed Jesus over was out of jealousy 
(Mark 15:IO, Matthew 27:18) Lonergan was on the same track, I believe, 
without having studied Girard's work, and I think this is reflected espe-
cially in his recognition of the importance of Max Scheler's book 
Ressentiment. 14 And if the biblical writings reflect a progressive revelation 
of the mimetic mechanism and of the deviated transcendence, the false 
religion, that it inspires, perhaps it is also true to say that history since then 
manifests a terribly slow appropriation of this revelation. Are we poised 
finally to make it our own in our time? Girard hopes so. The origin of the 
hope is the resurrection oEJesus: "The Resurrection is not only a miracle, 
a prodigious transgression of natural laws. It is the spectacular sign of the 
entrance into the world of a power superior to violent contagion. By con-
trast to the latter it is a power not at all hallucinatory or deceptive. Far 
from deceiving the disciples, it enables them to recognize what they had 
not recognized before and to reproach themselves for their pathetic flight 
in the preceding days. They acknowledge the guilt of their participation in 
the violent contagion that murdered their master."'5 
But Girard's hope is grounded also in the other divine mission, that of 
the Spirit. 
What is this power that triumphs over mimetic violence? The Gospels 
respond that it is the Spirit of God, the third person of the Trinity, the 
Holy Spirit . .. In the Gospel ofJohn the name given to this Spirit 
admirably describes the power that tears the disciples away from this 
all-powerful contagion: the Paraclete . . . The principal meaning of 
parakletos is "lawyer for the defense," "defender of the accused" ... 
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The Spirit enlightens the persecutors concerning their acts of 
persecution. The Spirit discloses to individuals the literal truth of what 
Jesus said during his crucifixion: "They don't know what they are 
doing" ... The birth of Christianity is a victory of the Paraclete over 
his opposite, Satan, whose name originally means "accuser before a 
tribunal," that is, the one responsible for proving the guilt of the 
defendants. 16 
Because of the gift of the Spirit, there is another kind of mimesis. It is 
found in Jesus's announcement of the reign of God, where it becomes an 
imitation of the Father that Jesus commands when he says, "You must 
therefore be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew SA8). 
What he means was explained several verses earlier: "Love your enemies 
and pray for those who persecute you; in this way you will be children of 
your Father in heaven, for he causes his sun to rise on the bad as well as 
the good, and his rain to fall on honest and dishonest alike" (Matthew 
S:44-4S)· 
The imitation of God that Jesus means when he says, "You must there-
fore be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew S:48), 
Lonergan anticipates when he refers to sanctifying grace and charity as 
created imitations, respectively, of the divine relations of active and passive 
spiration. 17 Active spiration is the Father and the Son as together they 
"breathe" the Holy Spirit. Passive spiration is the Holy Spirit thus breathed. 
In Lonergan's theological anthropology, being in love without restrictions, 
qualifications, conditions, reservations (which, he insists, is the meaning of 
the more metaphysical term 'sanctifying grace') is a created participation in 
active spiration, while the acts ofloving that flow from this entitative eleva-
tion coalesce into a habit of charity that is the created participation in pas-
sive spiration. But a created participation in active spiration is precisely an 
imitation of the Father and the Son, and if imitating the Father means what 
Jesus says it means, it is set directly over against the deviated transcendence 
that is rooted in acquisitive and conflictual mimesis. God creates in grace 
the imitation, the mimesis, that is truly life-giving, and that imitation, that 
mimesis, is an imitation of, in fact even a created participation in, the divine 
relations themselves. Grace, too, is radically interdividual, and the found-
ing subjects of the relations that it establishes are those divine subjects that 
themselves are eternal relations of self-transcendent love. 
r am currently writing a volume in systematic theology entitled The 
Trinity in History. In its present draft form there appears the following: 
"The Trinity in History" would presumably have a great deal to do and 
say about the problems of violence, and the collusion of religion in 
... 
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violence, that are at the heart of Girard's work. Relating the four-point 
hypothesis [Lonergan's hypothesis about created imitations of the 
divine relations] to Girard's mimetic theory from the outset of our 
endeavors is crucial for unpacking on the level of our time the meaning 
of the reign of God, and only such unpacking will keep our systematic 
theology in some sort of continuity with the mission of the incarnate 
Word in history. 
13 1 
The upshot of the present essay is that Bernard Lonergan and Daniel 
Berrigan have both spoken something of the truth about this God who 
manifested Godself incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth and who continues to 
break the power of violence through the gift of the Holy Spirit? They had 
different vocations within the same religious order, which itself serves God 
in the universal Church, but to the extent that they both spoke a true word 
about the God whom they have served, and especially to the extent that 
speaking that true word was an act of resistance against the forgetfulness 
that leads us to not know what we are doing, their vocations cannot be in 
dialectical conflict. ,8 I can only hope that stating this conviction as best I 
can in the present context is something of small tribute to Daniel Berrigan 
and that he will accept it in the spirit in which it is offered. 
